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ABSTRACT 
Projects typically involve multiple partners coming together to form a 
temporary project organization that manages project execution. 
Partners begin their relationship with soaring aspirations to 
collaborate but as they move through the project’s various phases 
and they experience friction, especially those related to cultural 
clashes, their noble aspirations succumb to creeping, if not full blown, 
crisis. This, in turn, creates lost relationality and compromised 
execution. Thus, the question: How can project partners manage the 
integration of differing corporate cultures and work processes to 
produce the most effective and efficient outcomes?  Using the mega 
project of the Panama Canal Expansion Program, the authors 
explore how a multicultural project organization moved from 
dysfunctional relationality to synergistic, self-reinforcing, 
collaboration. A “Collabyrinth” (Smits, 2013) model explores how 
participants learned to collaborate in a holding environment saturated 
with layers of complex cultural difference.  The Collabyrinth is 
composed of six comingling elements: (1) Conflicting Conditions, (2) 
Submarining, (3) Seeking Consent, (4) Storytelling, (5) Crafting 
Reciprocal Relations, and (6) Synergizing. 
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 Certain aspects of crisis management are employed to explain intra-collabyrinth 
dynamics. Those aspects are: (1) Coming of the Forerunners, (2) Acuteness in the 
Now, (3) Resolution Seeking, and (4) Constructing Relationality. Specific examples 
of the collabyrinth journey are provided and recommendations are made to harness 
the positive power of cross-corporate culture collaboration. 
Keywords: cross-cultural collaboration, crisis management, collabyrinth model, 
conflict resolution, Panama Canal Expansion Program 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Theoretical Perspective 
 Our philosophical grounding for this study fits within the constructionist 
ontological and interpretive epistemological traditions. In these traditions, social 
realities are seen as actively constructed, culturally and historically contingent, and 
laden with moral, public and personal values (SCHWARTZ-SHEA; YANOW, 2012; 
YBEMA et al., 2009). The constructionist-interpretive methodology informs the 
various methods through which data for this study was gathered. Central to this 
approach is that field researchers are ‘up close and personal’ to better understand 
the actors’ lived experiences (i.e., phenomenology).  
 The first author conducted an ethnographic study of the Panama Canal 
Expansion Program. The second author conducted a phenomenological-
ethnographic study of school district disruption resulting from a work stoppage.  
Ethnographic research shows that complex case studies can generate in-depth 
knowledge for theory building (WELCH; PIEKKARI; PLAKOYIANNAKI; 
PAAVILAINEN, 2011).  
 From July 2009 to July 2010 the first author interviewed and observed the 
project participants’ daily practices and documented their lived experiences. From 
June 2006 to May 2007, the second author conducted interviews, focus groups, and 
surveys to research how dysfunctional collaboration and functional difference 
contributed to crisis and its resolution. The focus here is on collaboration in the 
Expansion Program supported by the underlying influence of crisis.  
1.2. Context 
 The project owner, the Panama Canal Authority (further abbreviated as ACP), 
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 initiated the Expansion Program in 2006 to expand and modernize the Panama 
Canal with an estimated budget of US $5.25 billion. A key component in this mega 
project was the design and construction of the Atlantic and Pacific locks (known as 
the Third Set of Locks project).  
 With this set of wider locks the Panama Canal became accessible to very 
large container ships. To execute the construction of these locks, ACP contracted 
the consortium Grupo Unidos por el Canal (abbreviated as GUPC), consisting 
Spanish constructor Sacyr, Italian Impregilo (one of the world’s top-ranking 
construction groups, family owned Belgium dredging company Jan de Nul and Cusa, 
Panama’s leading construction company.  
1.3. Mega Projects and Collaboration  
 Mega projects are complex organizational systems composed of multiple, 
distinctive corporate cultures. These variables create challenges that are 
exacerbated by geographical distance and differing execution strategies must be 
dispersed across a complex a dense network of relationships (SCOTT; LEVITT; 
ORR, 2011). This often creates a highly unstable, conflicting context in which the 
project’s work must be accomplished.  
 Heifetz and Linsky (2002) call this condition a “holding environment,” meaning 
that work takes place within an environment that shapes its execution and the 
relationality of its project partners.  
 Project work is inherently a network of complex interactions informed by each 
partners’ culture and established work practices (BRESNEN; MARSHALL, 2011; 
ENGWALL, 2003; GRABHER, 2002; VAN MARREWIJK; CLEGG; PITSIS; 
VEENSWIJK, 2008). When conflictive, these interactions create tensions that imperil 
collaboration (JOSSERAND; CLEGG; KORNBERGER; PITSIS, 2004).  
 Hence, project managers are obliged to emphasize inter-organizational 
collaboration (DIETRICH; ESKEROD; DARLCHER; SANHAWALIA, 2010; 
HARTMANN; BRESNEN, 2011; VEENSWIJK; BERENDSE, 2008). Project 
managers with backgrounds in diverse national and organizational cultures tend to 
develop and promote collaborative governance practices (CLEGG, et al., 2002).  
 Those without such backgrounds tend to experience collaboration challenges 
when integrating work processes extant in different corporate cultures. That is to say 
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 that limited experience with the diversity of thought, problem solving, and working 
together can inhibit one’s insights, flexibility, and option-seeking thus making it 
difficult to effectively work with others. It is a form of corporate ethnocentrism that 
inhibits effective collaboration. 
 Originating from the Latin root words com and laborare, collaboration means 
‘to work together.’ Alan Mulally, former CEO of Ford Motor Company, used the 
phrase, “Working Together” as a mantra for developing the 767 when serving as 
CEO of Boeing Commercial Airplanes and used it again for leading Ford’s revival 
(HOFFMAN, 2012).  
 Dietrich, Eskerod, Durocher and Sandhawalia (2010) define collaboration as 
“a recursive process where people or organizations work together in an intersection 
of common goals by sharing knowledge, learning and building consensus” (p. 60).  
 Himmelman (1996) is more pragmatic, defining collaboration as, “a process in 
which organizations exchange information, alter activities, share resources and 
enhance each other’s capacity for mutual benefit and a common purpose by sharing 
risks, responsibilities and rewards” (p. 22). We define collaboration as a journey in 
which people learn to productively and harmoniously work together to achieve a 
desired end. 
 “Cooperation” and “coordination” approximate collaboration but are not its 
equal.  Short-term, informal interactions characterize “cooperation,” as when 
organizations maintain a relationship to share information at low levels of risk. 
Coordination requires more commitment and formal structures than cooperation.  
 Gittell (2005, 2016) has written extensively on relational coordination, a theory 
suggesting the relationship between high performance and relationality. 
Collaboration requires an ongoing, strong relationship between organizations that 
allows them to trust one another and to share knowledge and resources. 
Collaboration is the strongest form of working together relationship between 
organizations (KEAST et al., 2007).  
 In holding environments filled with ambiguity and conflict participants must 
navigate through their differing work practices. Sackman and Friesl (2007:145) argue 
that “when people join a project team, their individual identities are still rooted in their 
various home organizations, their profession and other groupings that they take part 
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 of in their life.” Actors enter an environment wherein they must integrate their 
differing organizational cultures and work practices and let go of some of their 
cultural assumptions and methods.  
 Differences in national and organizational culture challenge collaboration in 
project organizations because seemingly straightforward practices and assumptions 
may be executed differently in the various project partner organizations (HUXHAM, 
1996) and in national cultures that differ from their own. While the literature 
recognizes collaboration as a key element in effective project management, it is 
unclear on the importance of partners contributing their own unique corporate 
cultural perspectives to the project effort. 
 Most research on collaboration in project management focuses on elements 
that enhance collaboration among and between project partners. Pitsis et al. (2004), 
noted essential elements like trust, leadership, culture, and power for achieving 
collaboration.  
 Cicmil and Marshall (2005) studied “two-stage tendering,” which aims to 
improve team integration in the construction sector. They noted that two-stage 
tendering does not solve problems stemming from contradictions among and 
between partners’ competing cultures and deteriorating collaboration (CICMIL; 
MARSHALL, 2005).  
 Dietrich et al. (2010) identified factors influencing the quality of collaboration in 
multi-partner projects. These factors included trust between partners, commitment to 
the project, cultural proximity and expectations. Scholars rarely address how project 
participants manage their efforts to collaborate nor do they reveal how the culture 
(i.e.. holding environment) of the project organization shapes participants’ daily 
interactions (Jones; Lichtenstein, 2008).  
 In the context of cross-cultural collaboration, where multiple cultures interact 
and organizational processes merge, actors draw on their past cultural experiences 
to develop new understandings and processes that enable them to make sense of 
and live in a world where change is ongoing (BOYACIGILLER ET AL., 2004; 
HIBBERT; HUXHAM, 2010).  
 Sometimes this comes through an epiphany. Sometimes it is forced through 
the pain of crisis. In either case, it is through repeated interactions that project 
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 participants develop new common understandings redefining their collaborative 
relationship (PHILIPS; LAWRENCE; HARDY, 2000). Thus, collaboration in a project 
organization is not just about discarding old meanings and practices, it is also about 
negotiating new meanings and then developing new practices that adjust existing 
work processes (HARTMANN; BRESNEN, 2011) .  
 Studying how this process works can enhance our knowledge of the 
complexity underling collaboration and identifying crisis forerunner events that may 
impede collaboration.   
1.4. Holding Environments and Crisis 
 Some holding environments are more vulnerable to crisis than others. Mega 
projects are a case in point and especially mega projects that are layered with 
cultural difference (e.g., corporate, national, professional/functional). The evolution of 
crisis hampers normal operations, potentially harms the reputations of project 
leaders, and receives negative press and governing agency scrutiny.  
 Generally, there are six phases to managing crisis (BROWNLOW, 2007; 
2011). These phases are comingling, do not necessarily occur as independent or 
linear events, and are described below. These phases are described below and 
comingling and do not necessarily occur as independent or linear events. 
1.4.1. Phase I: Coming of the Forerunners 
 Forerunners are warnings that precede crisis. Successfully identifying 
forerunners can be challenging because the non-linear dynamics of co-mingling 
“unique” and “routine” warnings challenge detection. Crisis symptomology is complex 
and intermingled with multiple components in the holding environment. This is made 
more complex by corporate and national diversity factors that frame relationality. 
Successfully identifying and mitigating forerunners resolves issues before they 
become crisis (e.g., recognizing relationships are dysfunctional before they implode 
and bring the project to a halt). 
1.4.2. Phase II: Acuteness in the Now 
 “Acuteness in the Now” is the persistent, sometimes volatile expansion of 
negative events accompanied by concerted pressure for immediate resolution. It 
includes such unpleasantries as negative press and unwanted help from overseeing 
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 agencies. Working together relationships are tested and trust becomes a major issue 
as the holding environment becomes saturated with dissonance, dysfunction and 
aanxiety.  
1.4.3. Phase III: Technical Resolution  
 Technical resolution ends the immediate crisis and prepares for returning to 
normal operations. In the case of relationship crisis, managing aftermath can 
become its own creeping crisis because it creates stressor and control issues that 
require leaders to defend themselves against charges of incompetence and/or 
insensitivity. This was clearly the case in the Panama Canal Expansion Program. It 
is also often true in labor disputes. 
1.4.4. Phase IV: Post Mortem  
 Post mortem, sometimes called “lessons learned” or “after action review,” 
reveals human or process weaknesses that caused the crisis and assesses how 
such weakness can be mitigated to prevent a recurrence (e.g., learning about 
cultural difference before being thrust into a mega project layered with cultural 
complexity).  
 Post mortem can reveal information that humbles leaders. Humbling comes 
from questions about why certain warning signs were missed or why mitigating 
action was not taken sooner or why it was not more decisive or effective. Lessons 
Learned commonly morph into lessons recorded and stored on someone’s hard 
drive, never to be seen again. 
1.4.5. Phase V: Relationship Recovery/Reconciliation 
 Relationship Recovery/Reconciliation involves five integrated, interdependent, 
and collaborative actions that re-member a fragmented social and political capital 
network. Reconciliation begins with some form of heuristic reflective practice wherein 
there is the recognition that relationships must improve for the project to be 
completed within its cost and schedule parameters (BROWNLOW, 2011). Phase V 
crisis management corresponds to seeking consent in the Collabyrinth journey. 
1.4.6. Phase VI: Renewal 
 For our purposes, renewal is defined as reconstructing the dysfunctional 
social and political capital network into a more harmonious, synergistic, collaborative 
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 project organization. More specifically, it is moving away from the disruption of 
dysfunction and toward the synergy of collaboration. Renewal is the end result of 
synergy. 
 As noted above, for the purposes of this study, and working with the 
Collabyrinth, we have integrated and synthesized these six phases into the following 
components, Coming of the Forerunners, Acuteness in the Now, Resolution Seeking 
(reconciliation), and Constructing Relationality. 
1.5. The Expansion Program Collabyrinth 
 The project organization of the Panama Canal Expansion Program was a 
maze of different cultures (e.g., national, corporate, professional). Work practices 
represented each partner’s distinctive interests, perspectives, and management 
structures (SMITS, VAN MARREWIJK, VEENSWIJK, 2015). This complex holding 
environment required interactants to combine, and eventually integrate, their 
culturally preferred processes and to let go of some of their traditional methods.   
 Each had to negotiate their differences to reach consensus on deployment 
strategies. Negotiations required project participants to reflect upon and modify their 
corporate cultural preferences to enhance the effectiveness of the project 
organization. This reflected a form of group reflective process (BOUD; DOCHERTY, 
2006). 
 In essence, project partners were homogeneous in their project management 
values and basic work principles. Transparency, efficiency, and accountability were 
paramount. Unfortunately, applying these overarching values to daily work practices 
initially failed. When project partners actually began working together (i.e., 
collaborating), their corporate cultures collided. Their level of authority, position in the 
hierarchy, identity and ways of operating were challenged when opposing viewpoints 
generated friction among and between the project participants and actors frantically 
searched for harmony and stability by seeking consent.   
 The journey towards collaboration is a collabyrinth (Figure 1). The neology of 
‘collaboration’ and ‘labyrinth’ reflects the complexity of collaboration. Participants 
must find their way through a complex holding environment filled with treacherous 
terrain.  
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Figure 1: The Collabyrinth 
 As noted above, the Collabyrinth entails six interconnected practices (not 
phases) that lead to collaboration: (1) conflicting conditions, (2) seeking consent, (3) 
crafting reciprocal relations, (4) submarining, (5) storytelling, and (6) synergizing (see 
Table 1 for detailed explanation).  
 Like the phases of crisis management, these practices involve interactions 
that participants employ to make sense of how they can better work together to 
achieve the project’s mission. The six practices manifest how participants manage 
cultural complexity in the project’s holding environment and how their management 
of that complexity impacts subsequent working together relationships when friction 
occurs. 
 These practices are evolutionarily dynamic. That is, as people continuously 
translate and negotiate these practices they are simultaneously searching for ways 
through the collabyrinth. Further, like crisis management, the collabyrinth journey is 
based on transformational learning through reflective practice (MEZIROW, 1991). 
Put another way, participants reflect on what they are doing and, if needed, modify 
their behavior to effectively negotiate the power struggles that are inherently part of 
working together. This can also be seen as a “drilling through the layers of 
collaboration process,” as noted in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Crisis Management and the Collabyrinth 
2. CRISIS FORERUNNERS HINDERING THE COLLABYRINTH JOURNEY 
 Some practices hinder collaboration while others encourage it. Those that 
hinder can be considered forerunners to crisis. Noted below are the major conflicting 
conditions that were forerunners to crisis in the Panama Canal Expansion Program. 
2.1.  “Suspicious” Tender 
 On July 8, 2009, during a public ceremony held in Panama, the consortium 
Grupo Unidos por el Canal (GUPC) won the tender for the design and construction 
of locks on the Atlantic and Pacific side of the canal. This was the main component 
in the Panama Canal Expansion Program. GUPC, a temporary project organization 
overseeing the construction, was comprised of four companies: Spanish constructor 
Sacyr, Italian-based engineering company Impregilo, family owned Belgium dredging 
company Jan de Nul, and Panama’s leading construction company CUSA.   
 GUPC’s project bid gained the highest technical score and offered the lowest 
price (approximately US$ 3.2 B). The proposal attracted immediate concern because 
it was dramatically lower than the amount the Panama Canal Authority (ACP) had 
reserved for this aspect of the project. Frequently, proposed prices for construction 
projects in the infrastructure sector are higher than the budgeted price 
(FLYVBJERG; HOLM; BUHL, 2002).  
 It was alleged that GUPC had ‘left money on the table’ and project partners 
felt angst over the “suspicious” bid. The consortium was in uproar (FIELDNOTES, 
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 2009). This forerunner became a creeping crisis exacerbated by the project partners’ 
differing motives for participation. It overshadowed how the expansion project was 
managed by exerting tremendous cost performance pressure.  
2.2. Culturally Complex Holding Environment 
 The work environment was composed of multiple corporate cultures, complete 
with different work processes, hierarchies, and management styles. This was 
exacerbated by differing national cultures and related communication styles. An 
engineer on the Atlantic side of the project, noted:  
 I have worked in many joint ventures before, but here you can clearly 
see a difference: the Italians and the Spaniards work a lot different than the 
Belgians. They are less efficient. Yes, they work more hours a day, but they 
lose a lot of time chatting with each other. Also, they communicate with 
drama, it’s like a play in a theatre, and they take long breaks. That kind of 
stuff... (INTERVIEW, May 2010).  
 In terms of the corporate culture conflict, ‘Bart’ expresses his opinion about 
each partner in the project organization: 
Sacyr is simply weak and I think they have very little international 
experience. Okay, they have done some projects in Latin America, but 
outside of that, nothing I think. Impregilo is a firm with extensive international 
experience and they are relatively well organized. Of course, they are a 
bunch of mafiosos… Jan de Nul, well, here you immediately see the 
difference between ‘the northerners’ and ‘the southerners’: we go straight to 
our goal; we don’t walk around the bush (INTERVIEW, June 2010). 
  “Jerry” underscores the corporate culture differences: 
 Jan de Nul’s people are - they’re very different from the Sacyr or Impregilo or 
the CUSA’s people. They’re very different in their approach to the work and their 
demeanor is just much different that of the others (INTERVIEW, June 2010). 
 Initially, participants disagreed on process issues but quickly realized that 
regardless of their corporate culture preferences, they needed process consensus to 
achieve the project’s mission. Participants came to understand that layers of cultural 
complexity were impeding the project’s execution strategy. Table 1 describes central 
components of their collabyrinth journey and its relationship to our synthesized, 
integrated crisis management process. 
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 Table 1: The Collabyrinth Journey and Crisis Management in the Panama Canal 
Expansion Program 
Collabyrinth 
Components Description Illustration 
Conflicting 
Conditions 
Actors become aware of conflictive 
“corporate ethnocentric” practices 
that obstruct collaboration. 
Discord over bid proposal, cultural 
differences, roles and authority 
created complexity and friction. 
In crisis management: Coming of the 
forerunners, early warnings of 
impending crisis. 
Perceived slights and lost relationality 
resulting in poor collaboration and 
reduced effectiveness. 
Submarining 
Participants “clung” to their 
preferential way of executing work 
processes rather than embrace new 
ways and means. 
Marking boundaries and defending 
them, acting autonomously and “below 
the surface”. 
To cope with sustained conflict, 
participants distanced themselves by 
focusing on their portion of the contract 
and their idiosyncratic knowledge and 
skills. 
Reliance on their corporately defined 
comfort zone prevented process 
integration, creating angst between 
project partners. 
In crisis management: Acuteness in 
the now with the accompanying 
persistent, sometimes volatile 
expansion of negative events 
accompanied by extreme pressure 
for immediate resolution. 
Negative press and intervention from 
government agencies and the press 
project progress slows. 
Stressor and control issues required 
leaders to defend themselves against 
charges of incompetence and/or 
insensitivity. 
Seeking 
Consent 
Participants begin searching for work 
processes and decision criteria that 
they can share in common and can 
agree to. 
Defining cultural differences, and 
sharing their passion for their 
respective professions. 
From Crisis Management: Resolution 
Seeking/Reconciliation.  
Initiation of reconciliation behaviors to 
improve relationality. 
Storytelling 
Participants use stories to 
emphasize the project’s importance 
and the need for collaboration. 
Participants tell stories to share 
examples and forge common ground. 
From crisis management: Ongoing 
resolution seeking. 
Forming “Emergent We” emblematic of 
high levels of collaboration. 
Crafting 
Reciprocal 
Relations 
Chronic dysfunction creates a strong 
desire for collaboration so the project 
can be completed. 
Organizing activities and boundary 
spanning roles are implemented. 
 
From crisis management, 
Constructing relationality through 
dense social and political capital 
networks. 
Laying the foundations for synergy, 
which creates renewal. 
Synergizing 
Collaborative learning takes place as 
work processes and positive social 
and political capital are generated 
through integrated work processes. 
Cross cultural code switching 
becomes a prominent aspect of 
working together. 
Dysfunction drives actors to adapt best 
practices for project completion.  
Project achieves high levels of 
effectiveness and efficacy through 
productive working together 
relationships. 
From Crisis Management: End 
phase of constructing relationality 
resulting in high levels of effective 
Organizational renewal. 
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 collaboration. 
3. CRITICAL PRACTICES FOR CONSTRUCTING COLLABORATION 
 Once participants realized that working together relationships had to be less 
contentious they needed to determine how they could construct better relationality. 
Below we noted practices employed by the project’s participants. 
3.1. Seeking Consent  
 Seeking consent is the concerted desire, coupled to concerted effort, to 
improve collaboration. In the Panama Canal Expansion Program seeking consent 
saw participants reflect on and modify their known and comfortable work practices to 
forge consensus-driven relationships based on overarching common interest.  
 This was a negotiated process that included respecting and embracing the 
cultural complexity in their holding environment and understanding how comingling 
networks of social capital work in multicultural contexts. Project participants had to 
continuously reframe their individual corporate work practices and interpersonal 
interactions to make sense of a fluxing holding environment filled with coalitions. 
Putnam (2000, 2004) refers to such coalitions as dense networks of reciprocal 
relationships based on shared understandings (which is exactly what participants 
attempted to do and is also a crucial element in crisis management).  
 Seeking consent requires shared understandings and recognition of common 
interests. Dysfunction forced partners to express their feelings about their 
experiences in a dysfunctional holding environment and to make a complex, 
conflictive circumstance understandable to them. Seeking consent was a way to end 
the pain of crisis. Morris (2003) notes that to be in crisis is to be in pain. 
 In the emotional process of meaning making participants used several 
communicative practices that included storytelling and dialogue.  
3.2. Storytelling and Dialogue 
 As noted in Table 1, stories were introduced into the project’s holding 
environment to promote relationality. Storytelling created new perspectives on work 
practices by recognizing participants’ individual experiences and used that 
recognition to reshape their collaboration through consensus. Partners told unifying 
stories about how their roles connected to each.  
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  This led to an “Emergent We” wherein a new, “larger” group arose from 
interactions among the “smaller” groups that were not cross culturally engaged. 
Brownlow (2007, 2011) has defined “The Emergent We” as a community 
transcendent in its commitment to its members and its mission. The Emergent We 
can be seen as a form of negotiated culture (CLAUSEN, 2007). 
 Metaphors and dialogue were key to forming an Emergent We. Metaphors 
were used to safely describe thoughts and feeling about events in the holding 
environment. Dialogue made storytelling interactive. The meaning-seeking nature of 
dialogue caused participants to “know,” and know that they knew together.  
 Agreed upon collaboration emerged from “knowing” as people told the truth 
about their experiences within their part of the relationship network and what those 
experiences meant for them. Being willing to tell the truth about one’s experience 
carried the responsibility to listen to and accepting the experience of others as being 
valid.  
 Story and dialogue revealed that project partners had an event-filled, coherent 
story that led them to present circumstance (e.g., forerunners, acuteness in the now, 
seeking consent, constructing relationality, synergy). Those in the story were 
connected by its drama and had to discern what was essential in themselves and 
their organization as  the worked in a challenging holding environment.  
 Dialogue crafted reciprocal relations through synergy-seeking which ensured 
that no partner was marginalized. It became a distinguishing feature of project 
organization governance. This created faith in a future shaped by collaboration. 
Wheatley (2003) discusses faith in the future and coming together to build 
connection, friendship and collaboration.  
 However, there were still challenges because project partners maintained 
internal associations of strong friendships (social capital) between persons of similar 
position and profession within their group but treated other project partners with 
suspicion. The genuine test of friendliness and collaboration is not in how intra 
corporate culture members treat each other, but in how they treat others outside their 
culture who have differing views on important issues (REEVES, 2004).  
 Participants’ motivation to build a productive, working together relationship 
corresponded to their professional need to collaborate. Members of the project 
organization felt the emotional necessity to develop good relations with their co-
workers. Their drive to collaborate generated engagement in work and social 
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 activities that helped them to know one another better and to learn from each other. 
This strengthened the nature of their collaboration and encouraged open sharing of 
information and knowledge (DIETRICH et al., 2010; WHEATLEY, 2003, REEVES, 
2004; DARLING; ROSS, 2000). 
3.3. Crafting Reciprocal Relationships 
 Crafting reciprocity affirmed the worth of each partners’ contribution to the 
project and promoted an emotionally healthy work environment. This is consistent 
with the work of Gittell, (2016); Hodson, (2001, 2005); Weymes, (2003); and 
Wheatley, (2003).  
 In an emotionally healthy work environment each project partner reinforces 
trust and interdependence through collaborative problem solving. In the Panama 
Canal Expansion Program, collaboration became a pragmatic process wherein 
project partners mitigated the dissonance inherent cross cultural collaboration and 
over time obviated the need for submarining, or what Towers Perrin (2003) call 
“rational endurance.” 
 In essence, partners were building social and political capital by building 
social trust.   
3.4. Build Social Trust 
 Trust is essential to the collabyrinth journey and is dependent on situational 
and affective factors that influence how actors commit to their organizations (e.g., the 
project organization) and to each other (GITTELL, 2005, 2016). Trust evolved from 
execution strategies that were sensitive to the tenor of relationships among and 
between partners.  
 Seeking consent and crafting reciprocal relations framed the cognitive and 
affective character of the relationship network within the holding environment. 
Moving to this point in the collabyrinth was based on the antecedent experience with 
one another (e.g., from conflicting conditions to seeking consent). Participants were 
willing to trust enough to collaborate so each partner’s unique contribution can be 
realized and reach synergy.  
 Nearly two decades ago Darling and Russ (2000) argued that organizations 
are no longer built on economic force alone, but on trusting, collaborative 
relationships. This suggests the importance of balancing tasks and relationships, 
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 which is challenging in contentious, culturally complex environments. Collaborative 
practices overcame perceived inequities and the negative politics (e.g., the 
forerunners of crisis as in the original tender process) associated with mega projects 
(e.g., the Seattle Tunnel Project or Boston’s “Big Dig”). This made social trust a 
necessary practice for constructing the reciprocal relations necessary for creating 
synergy.  
 Trust influenced the holding environment’s social structure, the exchanges 
therein, and sense of justice as evidenced in shared events especially in regard to 
decision making. Authority hierarchy and spatial distance positively correlated with 
organizational politics and spatial distance factors were consistent with Van 
Marrewijk and Smits (2014).  
3.5. Nurturing Sustainable Relationships  
 There is no collaboration without sustainable relationships. Sustainable 
relationships reinforce the relational coordination connecting project partners to one 
another through understood rules, behaviors, and purpose. These elements were 
critical to collaborating on the project’s execution strategy. Sustainable relationships 
evolve from dense networks of reciprocal social and political capital.  
 They require dependability and accountability. Dependability is being present 
to others through the good and bad times. Accountability is being responsible for 
manifesting personal and professional commitment to collaboration and to mitigating 
submarining/rational endurance. Links between sustainable relationships and project 
identity were affirmed.  
 Synergy maintained the goodwill necessary for sustained collaboration within 
the project organization. Systemic solidarity flowed from dense relationships that 
were connected through social and political capital. The inference is that social and 
political capital comes from sustained positive reciprocal relations (i.e. collaboration).  
 Synergy forged positive social and political connections among and between 
project partners and over time partners formed friendships of varying strength and 
intensity. The power of relationality was in the actions leaders chose to take to 
promote sustained collaboration. This made collaboration a choice. Participants 
chose to participate or not to participate - which was emphasized by seeking 
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 consent. Social and work events acknowledged individuals and project partners as 
being more than their work product alone.  
 Ultimately, synergy was driven by realizing the criticality of the project’s 
mission to make a positive difference. This drove accountability, job satisfaction and 
trust. How a collaborative relationship network actually works in cross-cultural 
projects is determined by the layered elements of its culture and is sustained through 
interdependence, reciprocity and cultural intelligence (LIVERMORE; ANG, 2015; 
LIVERMORE, 2011).   
 Engagement manifested ongoing, responsive learning based on antecedent 
experience, as noted above. High priority was placed on nurturing the trust and 
collective intelligence for collaborating in a multicultural social structure within an 
unstable holding environment. The Panama Canal Expansion Program suggests that 
social structure influences collective knowing and mission performance and therefor 
cohesive and ongoing.   
 In the conflicting conditions stage of the collabyrinth journey the structural 
embeddedness of corporate culture influenced execution-oriented tasks, whereas 
relationality in seeking consent and crafting reciprocity influenced innovation-oriented 
tasks. This would seem to emphasize that the Expansion Program ended up being 
about relationships and results. Indeed, we suspect that the journey through the 
collabyrinth is about forming relationships to get to results. 
 Those with process knowledge to influence how resources were used had to 
integrate tacit and explicit knowledge with that of other projects partners. Sharing 
project partners’ tacit and explicit knowledge promoted genuine collaboration based 
on crafting trust and reciprocity. 
4. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 Future research may prove helpful in understanding how cross-corporate 
cultural conflict works in mega projects, especially those layered with cultural 
complexity. For example: 
(1) To what extent, if any, do Bolman and Deal’s (2013, 2014) concept of 
organizational frames influence collaboration when each corporate culture has 
a predominant frame that differs from the other partner organizations? 
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 (2) How do Edgar Schein’s conceptualizations of Humble Inquiry (2013) and 
Humble Consulting (2016) relate to seeking consent and forming reciprocity in 
the collabyrinth journey? 
(3) If collaboration depends on ongoing engagement through sustainable 
relationships, what are the tools most critical to developing and maintaining 
sustained engagement and are they generalizable to most project endeavors? 
5. CONCLUSION 
 Work is where we spend most of our time and invest in most of our 
relationships. The Collabyrinth journey mints the social and political capital 
necessary to achieve results that are shaped by a unifying theme that builds faith 
and hope in actions that build a better future. In this case, that better future was the 
increased flow of trade and goodwill among and between the global trading partners. 
 When faced with the challenge of executing a mega project in a culturally 
complex holding environment partners must continually re-examine the thematic 
unity of their project organization’s culture. Partners must understand that a part of 
their individual corporate culture must give way to the “Emergent We” formed by the 
collabyrinth journey.  
 Execution strategy must respect each project partner’s sources of legitimacy. 
Ignoring sources of legitimacy undermines the social and political capital structures 
within the holding environment and can lead to conflict and crisis. Conflict and some 
level of crisis are inevitable in any project endeavor. It is therefore important to, from 
the commencement of the project, to recognize the symptoms of crisis and have 
mechanisms in place for crafting reciprocal relations so partners can construct the 
relational foundation to resolve issues based on relational values and desired project 
outcomes. Laying this foundation supports project partners’ efforts to reach synergy, 
the ultimate goal of intercultural collaboration, and to achieve effective and efficient 
results. Therein lies the answer to our research question. Figure 2 maps the 
integration of crisis management and the Collabyrinth journey. 
 The complexity of mega projects politicizes execution strategy due to 
competing priorities among and between project partners. This requires adaptive 
changes that are entwined with stories, metaphors, and dialogues about the past, 
present, and future. Project organization memory is not obliterated by change but 
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 kept alive through adaptation that honors the network of relationships that brought 
the project to its present point in time. Honoring that network, and those within it, 
drives the synergy that makes working together for something beyond ourselves 
worthwhile.  
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